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Abstract: Patent pools for second and third-line Fixed Dose Combination (FDC) antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) should not 
be delayed as they are instrumental to urgent public health needs in the under-served markets. 
Nonetheless, multinational originator companies still seem to perceive patent pooling for ARVs as a minefield that would 
offer the generic competitors lots of deeply exploitable opportunities, to the detriment of patent owner’s rights. 
This paper analyses the brand industry concerns, while looking for a strategy up to a really equitable and free world 
market, without any discrimination between end-users in wealthy and resource-limited countries. 
This strategy would urge partnerships between originator companies first to make newer FDC ARVs quickly available 
and allow patent pool agreements with generic counterparts to be negotiated straight afterwards. 
The patent pool strategy highlighted in this paper would assert the primacy of health over for-profit policies, while 
aligning with the 61
st WHO’s Assembly recommendations and G7, G8 and World Trade Organisation’s warnings and 
pledges against trade protectionism. 
MEETING THE NEED 
  Patent pools are part of May 2008-adopted World Health 
Organization-WHO’s Global Strategy on Public Health, 
Innovation and Intellectual Property to help increase access 
to medicines [1]. 
  As far as antiretroviral (ARV) treatments are concerned, 
quantified benefits of the pools are expected to include, 
through skyrocketed market competition, substantially lower 
prices for second and third-line new Fixed Dose 
Combination (FDC) ARV formulations [2]. 
  Patent pools for antiretrovirals (ARVs) cannot be given 
up or delayed further owing to urgent health needs in the 
under-served markets: full availability of appropriate and 
affordable FDC ARVs including second and third-lines is 
top priority for the worst-off in the developing countries [3-
5]. 
  Attaining this goal would effectively counter bitter reality 
witnessing that ARVs are primarily developed for wealthy 
country markets, while trials are focused on coping with 
registration requirements in these countries and key research 
matters for resource-constrained populations are often only 
tackled long after drug registration and rolling-out in the 
Europe and USA [6]. 
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  Pooling ARV drug patents would carry out WHO’s calls 
on appropriately needed new FDC ARVs [7-9]. These may 
include adding heat-stable protease inhibitor (PI) ritonavir 
(RTV) to each atazanavir (ATV), darunavir (DRV), or 
saquinavir (SQV) PIs, or variously combining raltegravir (or 
other integrase inhibitors) with either newer heat-stable 
RTV-boosted PIs (also unboosted in the case of ATV) or the 
non-nucleoside reverse-transcriptase inhibitor (NNRTI) 
etravirine (pending results from raltegravir-novel NNRTI 
rilpivirine interaction studies). For paediatric purposes, 
combinations including heat-stable 35 mg emtricitabine 
tablets should be taken into account [6-9]. 
LOOKING INTO BRAND INDUSTRY CONCERNS 
  High-tech patent pool models not pertaining to health 
sectors (i.e., those involving technologies that require 
common standards, such as MPEG-2, DVD-video, DVD-
ROM and radio) have already gained agreement as fitting 
instruments to convey shared interests between peers 
towards increasing profits and marketing power [10]. 
  Medicines, instead, are trickier domain, particularly 
where ARVs are concerned. Actually, the situation for 
ARVS is different because their development remains 
profitable for the Western market. 
  Brand industry, indeed, still seems to perceive patent 
pooling for ARVs as a minefield that would offer the generic 
competitors lots of deeply exploitable opportunities, to the 
detriment of patent owner’s rights [11-14]. 
  Briefly, pooling ARV drug patents looks like it would be 
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profits in the under-served markets, in illegal flows of 
generic new FDC ARVs into the wealthy markets, in 
unbalanced boosting on innovation, development and 
research project activities currently pushed by generic drug 
manufacturers (mainly from India, China, Brazil, South-
Africa and Thailand) as a premise to enhanced competion 
and forays into the Western markets. Again, pooling patents 
could be felt as a risk to waive opportunities for fruitful 
voluntary license-VL agreements, and as a threat to keeping 
up brand leadership in research and development (R&D) of 
new therapeutic agents [11-14]. 
  Brand industry feelings on HIV drug patent pools likely 
take into account trade&policy plus R&D tricky balances on 
evolutionary world chessboard, where China’s and India’s 
paces look very fast [15]. 
  With regard to China, feelings may include awareness 
that today 2,500 life sciences faculty at US research 
universities are native Chinese, as are an estimated 10% to 
20% of scientists in the labs of US drug and biotech 
companies: now, in a steadily increasing reverse migration to 
China, these US-trained Chinese scientists are setting up 
high-standard biotech start-ups, contract-research companies, 
and university labs on their native mainland [16]. 
  In the meanwhile, the number of patent applications from 
China and India filed at the US patent Office has been rising 
rapidly [4]. 
  China and, to a lesser extent, India are, moreover, the 
major suppliers of active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) 
for ARVs to the developed and developing world [15]. This 
gives both countries power in influencing ARV drug price 
evolution. Indeed, as APIs do represent the largest 
components of direct manufacturing costs (55-99%), 
significant decreases in the price of ARVs will depend on a 
concomitant decrease in the cost of APIs [17]. Substantial 
research, deeply involving industries in middle-income 
countries, is dealing now with driving API cost reduction for 
access [18]. 
  Feelings above couple with the concerns bound up with 
threats to patent applications for brand ARVs, as per recently 
opposed refusals by India (including darunavir and tenofovir) 
and Brazil and predictably hard patentability in India of novel 
Abbott’s heat-stable RTV now that a corresponding Indian 
generic has long before come on line [15, 19]. 
  Again, China’s December 2008 law amendment stating 
that a Chinese patent can only be given to an invention or 
technology that is totally new worldwide looks like it would 
represent additional threat to brand industry interests [20]. 
  Eventually, brand industry feelings may also arise from a 
proposed law in India to allow universities to patent 
publicly-funded research discoveries and increase 
collaboration with Indian industries [21]. 
  On the whole, brand industry feelings sound quite 
understandable. Really, high-level standards in ARV drug 
manufacturing and marketing have already been achieved by 
the generic, mainly Indian, companies. Some key 
achievements are shown in Table 1, wherein we can notice 
1) that patent pools for first-line FDC ARVs for adults are no 
longer needed in the developing countries, 2) that patent 
pools for first-line FDC ARVs for children are needless, 
although full alignment by generic producers with all 
paediatric ARV formulations and dosages listed in WHO’s 
guidelines has yet to be reached, and 3) that a number of key 
FDC ARVs still are rolled out by the generic manufacturers 
only [7-9, 15, 22]. 
  Concerns of originator companies over patent pooling 
also ground on prospects alerting to the fact that UNITAID-
Clinton Foundation alliance has created a minefield for 
ARVs policies currently driven by the brand pharmaceutical 
sector. The Clinton Foundation HIV/AIDS Initiative (CHAI) 
is, indeed, increasingly lowering the prices of ARVs by 
partnering with UNITAID and generic pharmaceutical 
manufacturers [23-25]. 
  In the meantime, lists of countries eligible for differential 
pricing have been made available by Abbott, Bristol-Myers 
Squibb, Boehringer-Ingelheim, Gilead, GlaxoSmithKline, 
Merck & Co. Inc, and Roche brand enterprises: 
unfortunately, the prices they offer are almost always quite 
higher than the reduced ones by CHAI for the corresponding 
generics to countries in its consortium [22, 26]. 
  It is risky for the brand corporations to keep prices higher 
than Clinton’s, especially if the counterpart is a CHAI 
consortium member country. The magnitude of risk is 
perceivable by considering that: 
-  some FDC ARVs, still solely produced by generic 
firms (Table 1), have been made available to 
resource-constrained countries only thanks to CHAI 
discounts [15]. 
-  Clinton consortium is expected to add further 
countries to its 71 members (as of December 2008), 
so leading to far cheaper ARVs as a result of 
enhanced bulk procurement [15, 25]. 
  Overall, the perspectives listed above are feared to 
possibly reshape or even overturn the trade balances bound 
up with profitable ventures currently working between 
originators and, mainly, Chinese and Indian drug makers as 
far as R&D sectors are specifically concerned (see later) 
[27]. 
  Again, whole insights above may explain the request by 
some brand companies for further incentives to be attached 
to a patent pool model recently proposed by UNITAID and 
focused, first and foremost, on ARV drugs [14, 28, 29] 
(available details in previous articles inside this Open AIDS 
Journal issue). 
  Intriguingly, brand industry positions towards patent 
pools for ARVs may also depend on strategies bound up 
with their pipelines for new ARV drug development. 
Understandably, exploitation of patent full rights until expiry 
could be an option where no new ARVs are in the pipeline. 
On the contrary, the more drugs are in pipeline, the more 
brand industry availability will expectedly emerge towards 
flexible transactions, so keeping up as much options as 
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  Again, openings could happen when exchange for royalty 
payment, as in UNITAID model, would possibly compensate 
for profit losses bound up with the rolling out of generic 
FDC ARVs that include second-line principles whose 
patentability is being pursued by the brand patent owner 
(Table 1). 
 Additional  food for thought could be solicited by relevant 
questions: 
-  What extent is the real originator companies’s interest 
towards emerging markets where a number of well-
off elites, who can afford out-of-pocket spending (at 
least 300 million people in India, many more in 
China), currently live? 
-  Owing to FDCs are no doubt the ARV therapy 
backbone, why should originator companies hesitate 
to boost patent pool strategies as set up for Bristol-
Myers Squibb & Gilead Sciences’s ATRIPLA® 
(efavirenz,  emtricitabine, and tenofovir FDC), to 
properly address at least adherence? 
GATHERING STEAM FOR AWARENESS 
  On the whole, conflictual insights above would suggest 
the originator companies to increase awareness and take the 
lead towards shrewdly adopting UNITAID patent pool 
model. Otherwise, as seemingly foreseeable from 
trade&policy world trends, their opportunities could be in 
jeopardy or reduced in the future. 
  Indeed, the agreement on TRIPs (Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual property Rights) of World Trade Organization 
(WTO) does not formally obstruct the UNITAID patent pool 
model [30, 31], while steadily increasing pro-pooling 
overpressure is registered from public opinion, mass media, 
NGO networks, UN Agencies, as well as from governments 
and firms in the developing countries. Taken together, these 
realities could result, if the brand multinationals did refuse to 
enter the pool, in enforced compulsory licenses (CLs) [11]. 
These would stand as detrimental to brand enterprise 
expectations, predictably due to tighter room for negotiations 
and constraining clauses over enjoyable royalties. 
Compulsory licensing (CL) would really be an option in 
such a case to force into reasonable terms patent holders 
deemed to be non-cooperative in the face of serious health 
risks. 
  CL feasibility would be, anyway, hard bet now that 
protectionist policies and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are 
still driven by USA and European Union (EU) in spite of 
recent WTO, G7 and G8 leaders warns and pledges against 
trade protectionism [32, 33]. Nonetheless, in mid-long term 
perspective, CL feasibility could impose itself as a result of 
confluent factors, among which: 
Table 1.  Fixed-Dose Combination ARVs by Generic Manufacturers 
 
•  AZT/3TC: adult formulations by Aspen, Aurobindo, Cipla, Emcure, Hetero, Matrix, Ranbaxy and Strides. The Clinton Foundation has negotiated 
reduced prices with Cipla and Matrix. Paediatric formulation by Matrix. 
•  AZT/3TC/ABC: adult formulations by Aurobindo (co-pack), Cipla, Hetero, Matrix, and Ranbaxy. No paediatric formulations. 
•  AZT/3TC/NVP: adult formulations by Aspen (co-pack), Apotex, Aurobindo, Cipla, Hetero, Matrix, Emcure, Ranbaxy. The Clinton Foundation has 
negotiated reduced prices with Aurobindo, Hetero, Cipla and Matrix. Paediatric formulations by Matrix, Government Pharmaceutical Organization 
(GPO) and Ranbaxy. Not available from originator companies. 
•  D4T/3TC/NVP: the Clinton Foundation has negotiated with Aurobindo, Hetero, Matrix, Cipla and Ranbaxy reduced prices for adult formulations. 
Adult formulation also made by Emcure and Strides. Paediatric formulations by Cipla, Hetero, GPO, Emcure, and Ranbaxy (reduced prices in 
Clinton’s consortium for versions by Cipla and Ranbaxy). Not available from originator companies. 
•  ABC/3TC: adult formulation by Cipla. Paediatric formulations by Matrix and Aurobindo (reduced prices in Clinton’s consortium). 
•  D4T/3TC: adult formulations by Aurobindo, Cipla, Hetero, Matrix, Ranbaxy, Emcure, and Strides. Paediatric formulations by Cipla, Emcure and 
Ranbaxy. Not available from originator companies. Reduced prices in Clinton’s consortium for versions by Aurobindo, Cipla, Hetero, Matrix, 
Ranbaxy, Strides. 
•  Heat stable LPV/RTV: adult formulations by Aurobindo, Emcure, Cipla and Matrix (reduced price for Aurobindo, Cipla and Matrix versions in the 
Clinton Foundation’s consortium). Paediatric formulations by Aurobindo and Matrix. N.B.: generic soft gel capsule LPV/RTV are currently produced 
by Cipla and Hetero (no paediatric formulations). 
•  D4T/3TC+EFV: adult formulations by Cipla, Emcure, Strides and Ranbaxy. No paediatric formulations. Not available from originator companies. 
•  AZT/3TC+EFV: adult formulations by Aurobindo, Cipla, Emcure, Ranbaxy. No paediatric formulations. Not available from originator companies. 
•  PMTCT: NVP+AZT: granule formulations by Strides. Not available from originator companies. 
•  TDF/FTC: adult formulations by Cipla, Emcure, Hetero and Matrix (reduced price for Matrix version in the Clinton Foundation’s consortium). Not 
for paediatric use. 
•  TDF/3TC: adult formulation by Matrix and Cipla (reduced price in the Clinton Foundation’s consortium). Not for paediatric use. Not available from 
originator companies. 
•  TDF/FTC/EFV: adult formulation by Matrix (reduced price in the Clinton Foundation’s consortium), Emcure and Cipla. Not for paediatric use. 
•  TDF/3TC+EFV: adult formulation by Cipla. Not for paediatric use. Not available from originator companies. 
•  TDF/3TC/EFV: adult formulation by Matrix (reduced price in the Clinton Foundation’s consortium). Not for paediatric use. Not available from 
originator companies. 
•  TDF/3TC+ATV+heat stable RTV (starting in 2010): by Mylan/Matrix (reduced price in  the Clinton Foundation’s consortium). Not available from 
originator companies. 
AZT = zidovudine, 3TC = lamivudine, ABC = abacavir, NVP = nevirapine, D4T = stavudine, LPV/RTV=lopinavir/ritonavir, EFV=efavirenz, TDF=tenofovir, FTC=emtricitabine,  
ATV = atazanavir, PMTCT = prevention mother-to-child transmission. 
WHO prequalified ARVs (updated list) at [53]. 
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  Weakening USA trade&policy appeal over South-
East Asia, South-America and Africa due to the 
emergence of strong competitors such as China, 
India, and Russia. 
  Weakening USA attraction power and influence over 
international chessboard. 
  Rising EU reliability through improved member 
governments alignment in operational and decisional 
patent-related issues [34]. 
  Increasingly mounting evidence of government CLs 
against first and second-line brand ARV single 
products [4, 15]. 
TAILORING MODEL FOR EQUITABLY DRIVEN 
FREE WORLD MARKET 
  Overall scenarios above look like they are enough to 
advise the originator companies that joining efforts into 
long-term shared strategy, as part of UNITAID patent pool, 
would be mandatory to fairly attune the interests of all 
counterparts (including end-users and generic and brand-
name enterprises). 
  Coherently, UNITAID model should play as key 
component of a more complex strategy up to going beyond 
UNITAID proposal itself and equitably countering brand 
market erosion deemed to follow the mere patent right 
giving up to the advantage of generic drug industry. 
  This strategy should encompass full availability on the 
market of second and third-line brand FDC ARVs as a result 
of partnerships between originator companies. 
  Actually, it appears that these directions, though at their 
beginning, have already been set in motion: contacts 
between originator companies seem, indeed, currently being 
underway as far as joint manufacturing and rolling out of 
second and third-line brand FDC ARVs are concerned [35]. 
This would make a difference, especially now that brand 
heat-stable RTV is about to become available [36]. 
  Again, these brand moves would pull off substantial deal 
now that South industry high-level skills on innovation, 
manufacturing and marketing do entwine with steadily 
increasing both South-South cooperation examples and 
outsourcing models in North-South R&D joint ventures [16, 
27, 37-49]. 
  Multinational pharma companies are, indeed, currently 
striking deals with Chinese and Indian drug researchers to 
outsource testing for drug candidates and replenish drug 
development pipelines, while accelerating, thanks to the 
efficiency of Eastern laboratories, a development process 
and saving billions of dollars in costs (in India, five PhD 
chemists can be employed for the cost of one in the West). 
Concurrently, Eastern researchers are benefitting through 
profit shares and intellectual property rights, while being 
aware that these collaborations will spur new breakthroughs 
in medical research and develop a local industry originally 
built on mere generic drugs [27]. 
  Taken together, these realities mean that peer trade 
competition between wealthy and middle-income countries 
is already round the corner. 
  As core message, the whole insights above would urge 
partnerships between originator companies first to make 
newer FDC ARVs quickly available (including combinations 
aligned with WHO’s recommendations), and allow patent 
pool agreements with generic counterparts (as per UNITAID 
model) to be negotiated straight afterwards. 
  This strategy looks like it would be up to attaining a 
really free and equitably driven world market. 
  Indeed, while securing the generic producers opportunities 
and equipment to make and roll out second and third-line 
(either for adults or children) new FDC ARVs, it would not 
prevent the generic and brand counterparts from negotiating 
mutually profitable VLs, if any. To the same extent, this 
strategy would be up to allowing the originator firms to still 
keep up competitiveness as far as bulk purchasing 
agreements for new FDC ARVs with CHAI-UNITAID are 
concerned. 
  Hopefully, the highlighted strategy should include getting 
round and lifting a clause in UNITAID patent pool model 
that would forbid selling to High Income Countries (World 
Bank defined) FDC generic ARVs resulting from patent 
pools. To this aim, compulsorily aligning prices of these 
generic formulations with the corresponding brand ones on 
wealthy markets should be enough measure against unfair 
competition. 
  Mutually, the model here should not prevent brand name 
FDCs from entering the developing countries, provided their 
prices align with those applied by CHAI-UNITAID for the 
corresponding generics [22]. 
  Overall, the highlighted model would spread good 
treatment adherence all over the world, while scaling up, on 
sustained basis, equitable access to appropriate and 
affordable new FDC ARVs, with no discrimination between 
end-users in wealthy and resource-limited countries. 
  Again, upon brand industry angle of view, the 
compounded strategy here would allow to keep up R&D 
standards and marketing power, while enjoying the 
advantages from new partnerships, avoiding risks of CLs, 
and predictably getting round the need for additional 
incentives to enter patent pools. 
  Upon generic industry perspective, instead, this model 
would extensively boost innovation, joint ventures and 
competitiveness also beyond the under-served markets. 
  The multi-pronged strategy envisaged in this contribution 
would recommend originator companies to improve their 
policies, while tackling evolutionary directions from 
emerging markets and bringing opportunities to the generic 
counterparts.  So compounded, it  would  promote and 
enhance: 
  For-equity dynamics in drug trading policies, while 
meeting the interests of generic and brand 
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  Effective response to HIV resistance mutations urging 
availability of second/third-line FDC ARVs in low-
income countries. 
  R&D and international standard innovation plans. 
  South-South and North-South partnerships. 
  Opportunities for researchers working in developing 
countries. 
  Domestic employment and national/international 
market increases. 
  Indigenous capacity to generate, manage and use 
technology to address domestic health needs. 
  Setting up of country-owned plants for generic ARVs 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, so adding strength for 
profitable negotiations, while drawing originator 
companies into more flexible agreements. 
  Fulfilment of prospects above will depend on crossing 
policies of multiple counterparts, including European Union, 
USA, China, India, Brazil, South Africa and Thailand’ s 
government directions. While the end-results of these 
policies are hardly predictable, available trends seem to 
advise that the highlighted strategy would be an attuned way 
in long-term perspective, by complementing, rather than 
replacing, current regimens. 
  The strategy suggested here aligns with both the 61
st 
WHO’s Assembly recommendations and G7 finance 
ministers, G8 and WTO’s recent warnings and pledges 
against protectionist policies. 
  Clearly, the highlighted model would be only one factor 
among several in determining outcomes [15, 50-52]. 
  It would impact, anyway, as a step ahead in establishing 
a new era: that actually asserting, through equitably driven 
free world market, the primacy of right to health over for-
profit policies. 
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